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Abstract 
The field of comparative economic systems has been recently enriched by the arrival of the new 
comparative economics. This approach is in the line of the law and finance tradition and presents an 
important contribution under different perspectives. In the paper I present the most important 
propositions of this new approach and I evaluate them in the light of the problems that the comparative 
study of economic systems traditionally considers. The conclusion is that this new approach can give 
important contributions to the development of the discipline in particular fields, but falls short of its 
pretended general validity. 
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1.  Introduction 
The changes that took place since late Eighties, particularly globalisation and 
transition, have had profound consequences for economics. These consequences were 
particularly dramatic for fields that have traditionally dealt with economic systems that 
have disappeared or have been deeply changed. Comparative economic systems is 
certainly among the first in the list of affected fields. 
This situation has prompted many, particularly in the academic world, to raise 
the crucial question: “is comparative economic systems (comparative economics) 
dead?”2 The most recent answer given to this question has been advanced by a group of 
well-known authors, mostly based in Harvard and at the World Bank,3 who are usually 
in the line of the rapidly growing field of law and finance. These authors have applied 
their peculiar approach to analysing an extensive database having mostly to do with such 
important institutions as ownership, finance, law, government, and regulation “around 
the world”. 
                                                 
1 E-mail: bruno.dallago@economia.unitn.it. The research on which this paper is based has been 
implemented while I was visiting professor at the Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of 
Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo. The support of the Center is gratefully 
acknowledged. The paper has been written in the framework of a research project financially sponsored 
by the Italian Ministry for Education, University and Research (MIUR). I am grateful to James 
Angresano (Albertson College of Idaho), Michael Keren (The Hebrew University), Juro Teranishi 
(Hitosubashi University), Adrian Van Rixtel (European Central Bank), Yupana Wiwattanakantang 
(Hitosubashi University), and the participants to a workshop at the Center for Economic Institutions 
(November 20, 2003) for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. However, any 
responsibility for errors and weakness of analysis remains solely with the author. 
2 Although there are some important differences between the two, in the present work I consider 
comparative economic systems and comparative economics as synonymous. 
3 Among the most active participants to the project discussed here are Simeon Djankov, Edward L. 
Glaeser, Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. 
Vishny.  
EJCE, vol. 1, n. 1 (2004) 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
60 
The answer that these authors give to the above question is a straightforward 
one: NO. This simple answer in itself makes this line of research particularly interesting 
and important for the scholars in the more traditional field of comparative economic 
systems (CES). The motivation that the above authors give to their answer is presented 
as follows:  
“Traditional comparative economics has evolved into a new field. This field shares with its 
predecessor the notion that by comparing alternative economic systems, we can understand 
better what makes each of them work. But it sees the key comparisons as being those of 
alternative capitalist models that prevail in different countries. Each capitalist economy has 
many public and private institutions. These institutions function to choose political leaders, to 
secure property rights, to redistribute wealth, to resolve disputes, to govern firms, to allocate 
credit, and so on. Political economy over the last two centuries, as well as recent empirical 
research, demonstrate that these institutions differ tremendously and systematically among 
countries, with significant consequences for economic performance. The analysis of these 
differences is the subject of the new comparative economics.” (Djankov et al. 2003a., p. 1) 
This quotation offers some food for thought. That CES has to evolve, and 
possibly refocus, few in the field would doubt. Is the new comparative economics 
(NCE) the good and correct answer? Are the topics it examines, the methods it uses and 
the analysis it performs really contributing new ideas and new solutions to the field? 
And if so, in which sense? Which are these ideas, methods and solutions? In which 
sense do they differ from more traditional ones? Are they compatible or are they 
antagonistic with those more deeply established in the discipline? 
There are at least three other reasons beyond its novelty and aim why careful 
attention should be paid to this contribution. First, law and economics is part of the 
broad field of institutional economics and therefore comparative economists should 
devote particular attention to it, since institutional economics is akin CES both 
methodologically and in the field of study. The second reason for devoting particular 
attention to the NCE is the name of the authors. Third, the important approach of 
relative efficiency, that the NCE places at the heart of its explanation, is a serious 
candidate for fruitful analysis of intersystemic differences and an important contribution 
to reform drawing, planning and implementation. 
In the above quotation, the proponents of the NCE make three important 
statements that are worth examining in some depth. First, they write that the NCE 
shares with its predecessor the notion that by comparing alternative economic systems, 
we can understand better what makes each of them work.4 Since we are all convinced 
that this is so, there is no need to investigate this issue any further. 
Second, the NCE sees the key comparisons as being those of alternative 
capitalist models that prevail in different countries. This is presented in an ostensible 
contradiction with CES, which is considered to be concerned only, or at least in large 
part, with non capitalistic systems. Although there is much truth in the statement that 
CES scholars have at first given priority to socialist systems and later to transition issues, 
the statement is at least imprecise. There is therefore a need to devote some effort to 
clarifying this issue. Since this issue is not central in the NCE analysis, I will postpone its 
discussion to section 9. 
Third, there is a stress on the fact that institutions differ tremendously and 
systematically among countries, with significant consequences for economic 
                                                 
4 “… the comparative perspective, which identifies both the possibilities and the limitations of individual 
societies, can serve as a useful framework for future progress.” (Djankov et al. 2003a, p. 39). See also 
(Shleifer 2002, p. 12).  
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performance. The NCE states that the analysis of these differences is its subject of 
research. This implies that the correct benchmark of comparison is (institutional) 
efficiency.5 This is, in my view, the most interesting and important contribution of the 
NCE to the field. Much of this paper will be devoted to a discussion of this issue, since 
the apparent outcome of the exercise is an appealing theoretical explanation which hides 
the risk of excessive analytical simplification and may produce a justificationist and 
rationalising interpretation of the data. In doing so, I will make reference primarily to 
the two papers that present directly the authors’ effort at establishing the NCE 
(Djankov et al. 2003a, Shleifer 2002). However, since these papers are in a sense the 
summary of a broad and long lasting research program, due attention will also be paid to 
other contributions by this group of authors. 
Most of this paper illustrates and examines critically the NCE contribution to 
this third issue. In section 2 I introduce the New Comparative Economics and highlight 
its main features. Each of the following sections focuses on a particular aspect of the 
NCE and presents my analysis of its strengths and weaknesses. Section 3 presents the 
basic NCE idea of comparative institutional efficiency and the following section 4 
outlines the premises of the comparative institutional efficiency analysis. In section 5 the 
institutional possibility frontier (IPF) is introduced as the basic NCE instrument to 
represent and analyse comparative institutional efficiency. Civic capital as the basis of 
the IPF is discussed in section 6, together with the role of the legal system. Section 7 
looks at the consequences of this approach for institutional reform and section 8 
discusses the role of legal origin. Section 9 considers earlier contributions to the idea of 
a “new” comparative economics and discusses the overall situation of CES to assess 
whether the NCE criticism of CES is well taken. Section ten concludes by considering 
the relation of the NCE with CES. 
2.  The New Comparative Economics 
The basic message of the NCE can be divided into two steps. In the first step 
the NCE organises what one could define as the core variables. Since these are 
insufficient to clarify all the issues that the NCE intends to explain, in a second step the 
complementary variable of civic capital is introduced. 
The starting point is human nature, i.e. the individuals’ inclination to subvert 
social institutions to their personal gain. Since this threatens to create disorder, which 
would jeopardise economic activity, state intervention is necessary. However, the latter 
creates the danger of dictatorship. 
The trade-off between disorder and dictatorship is affected by the legal system, 
although it is also true that the “law and order” endowment of a particular economy 
determines which legal regime is efficient. In particular, a pure liability regime is efficient 
in conditions of law and order. When the latter does not hold, a regulatory regime is the 
only possibility. The trade-off between disorder and regulation, under the influence of 
the legal system, determines institutional efficiency, i.e. which institutions are the most 
efficient in securing property rights. These in turn determine economic performance. 
This description is insufficient to explain why institutional efficiency is different 
in diverse economies. This depends on the absolute level and mix of disorder and 
                                                 
5 However, the authors go beyond the efficiency issue to admit that there may be other ways of choosing 
institutions. In particular, they deal with the important issue of the transplantation of institutions 
through conquest and colonisation.  
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dictatorship that exists and is tolerable in a given society, which in turn depends on civic 
capital. Civic capital, then, explains the actual possibilities of a particular economy. This 
element is corroborated by the role of technology, which further refines the issue of 
disorder and dictatorship. 
Considering all these elements and with some simplification, the overall 
explanation advanced by the NCE is outlined in the following Chart 1. 
 
Chart 1. The NCE explanation of comparative institutional efficiency 
 
 
3.  Comparative institutional efficiency 
The core of the NCE lies in the concept of institutional efficiency. Similarly to 
Coase (1960), the NCE intends to identify which institutional arrangements are more 
efficient in securing property rights. Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) consider three plus one 
alternative institutional arrangements: private litigation, government regulation, a 
combination of the two, and doing nothing. In a following work, intended to establish 
the NCE (Djankov et al. 2003a), socialism is added to the previous three arrangements. 
The importance of the law enforcement strategy that society chooses comes 
from the fact that private individuals are considered naturally self-interested. They will 
seek to subvert the law workings to benefit themselves. This creates a threat of disorder 
that jeopardizes property rights and consequently business and economic life.6 Disorder 
                                                 
6 “The two central dangers that any society faces are disorder and dictatorship. By disorder we mean the 
risk to individuals and their property of private expropriation in the form of murder, theft, violation of 
agreements, torts, monopoly pricing, and so on. Disorder, in this framework, is also reflected in private 
subversion of public institutions, such as courts, through bribes and threats, which allows private 
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must be put under control in some way, either privately or by the state or in any 
intermediate mixed way. However, the intervention of the state opens the way to 
dictatorship, of which socialism is the extreme form. 
The NCE sees (formal) institutions in a narrow functional perspective, whereby 
their role is to control the twin dangers of dictatorship and disorder. Moreover, no 
mention is made of the role of informal institutions except in the case of 
transplantation, but then only in an implicit way. A dynamic element is introduced by 
considering that institutions are vulnerable to subversion by the potential violator 
making use of a number of both legal and illegal strategies.7 However, as long as 
institutions work properly, “[t]he theory leads to predictions as to what institutions are 
appropriate under what circumstances.” (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003, p. 401). This is 
clearly an ambitious research program, which has the explicit goal of replacing the 
traditional CES framework with a new paradigm. In this new perspective, comparative 
economics would become a simple, although important, chapter of (a particular brand 
of) the property rights interpretation of the world.  
After this summary description, in order to evaluate this program of re-founding 
CES it is useful to assess how the NCE answers two crucial questions. First, in which 
sense and in which ways are different legal regimes vulnerable to subversion? That is, in 
which sense can we speak of comparative (in)efficiency of alternative legal regimes? 
Second, how can efficient institutions evolve, particularly so if we consider the role of 
subversion? 
The NCE answer to the first question reveals an important similarity with the 
CES approach. In fact, the NCE answer is based on the features of the context in which 
the legal regime is embedded. However, this NCE context is rather thin, since it is 
reduced to the issue of law and order, however important this may be. To understand 
this point, we can follow the proponents by considering the two opposite legal regimes:8 
a pure liability regime and a regulatory regime. 
According to the NCE, pure liability regimes entail the risk of having to make 
large payments with a small probability. Particularly in environments lacking law and 
order, such regimes are more vulnerable to ex post subversion than regulatory regimes. 
Therefore, when law and order hold, pure liability regimes are efficient. However, in the 
absence of law and order a regulatory regime is more efficient than a pure liability 
regime. In intermediate cases mixed solutions prevail. This explanation is complemented 
with other variables that the literature has shown to be important, such as stronger 
                                                                                                                                          
violators to escape penalties. By dictatorship we mean the risk to individuals and their property of 
expropriation by the state and its agents in the form of murder, taxation, violation of property, and so 
on. Dictatorship, in this framework, is also reflected in expropriation through – rather than just by – the 
state, as with the use of regulators to eliminate entry by competitors. Some phenomena, such as 
corruption, are reflections of both disorder and dictatorship: in so far as individuals pay bribes to avoid 
penalties for harmful conduct, corruption is a reflection of disorder, but in so far as officials create 
harmful rules to collect bribes from individuals seeking to get around them, corruption is a cost of 
dictatorship.” (Djankov et al. 2003a, pp. 6-7) 
7 “The legal ones include acquiring favourable legislation and regulation (even after an accident), lobbying 
for an appointment of friendly law enforcers (including both judges and regulators), hiring top lawyers, 
or using delay tactics in case of a suit. Illegal subversion strategies include intimidating and bribing 
judges, regulators, or juries. By expending sufficient resources on subversion of justice, the potential 
violator can avoid regulatory fines and liability payments.” (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003, p. 402) 
8 We leave socialism out of consideration for the moment, since socialism is considered incompatible with 
private property. This initial disregard is a serious heuristic flaw in the way towards generalization of the 
new approach.  
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incentives and greater specialization of regulators compared to judges (for a 
contribution on this point by the same group of authors see Glaeser et al. 2001). 
In a later contribution (Djankov et al. 2003a) a framework is presented that 
describes the tradeoff between dictatorship and disorder and also introduces the 
extreme case of socialism (the purest case of dictatorship with very low level of 
disorder). This framework is then applied to the problem of social control of business. 
It is worth noting that the authors do not support the view that efficient institutions 
eliminate the dangers of disorder and dictatorship. These are simply reduced to the 
minimum possible level, given the features of the society – to be discussed in section 6. 
This is, I believe, one of the most important statements of the NCE, which identifies an 
interesting point of possible cooperation with CES.9 
The answer to the second question introduces an interesting evolutionary 
element, that is however restricted and remains undeveloped: “Efficient institutions 
could evolve from democratic pressures (…), from the influence of growth-seeking 
interest groups such as merchants (…), from a Coasian negotiation among the members 
of the elite, such as the Magna Carta or the American Constitutional bargain (…), or 
from a long term evolutionary process described by Hayek (…).” (Djankov et al. 2003a, 
p. 9) The authors also criticize the special interest group theory and do not support it as 
a convincing explanation of comparative institutional efficiency, although they do not 
see this theory as incompatible with their theory of institutional subversion (Glaeser and 
Shleifer 2003, pp. 417-419). 
This quotation is the boldest dynamic perspective of the NCE, which CES can 
easily share. However, it falls short of explaining why, under which conditions, and how 
efficient institutions evolve. It does not answer the basic evolutionary theory statement 
that the selection process does not necessarily generate efficient solutions. Those same 
evolutionary processes could also generate inefficient institutions (Nelson 1995). The 
only clear answer NCE gives on this point is that inefficient institutions can be the 
outcome of transplantation. The NCE is simply uninterested in the dynamic 
evolutionary perspective.  
4.  The premises of the comparative institutional efficiency analysis 
In general, security of property rights is an important, although incomplete 
foundation to systemic differences, since it may be the basis of different types of 
behaviour and decision making of actors, not necessarily all in line with performance 
maximisation (including rent-seeking attitudes and wealth hoarding). Moreover, it has 
been shown that – at least under certain circumstances – weak definition and 
enforcement of property rights may also provide powerful incentives to economic 
activity (Li, 1996). The proponents of the NCE, for whom property rights have central 
importance in explaining differences among economic systems, are not aware of the 
latter problem, and do not consider the former. Indeed, they stress only the double 
threat of expropriation of investment in case of unprotected propriety rights. They 
maintain that property rights must be secured, typically by the state, against the threat of 
private expropriation of investment by other private actors. But a state sufficiently 
                                                 
9 “…looking at efficient institutional choices does not mean that, in equilibrium, the society eliminates the 
problems of dictatorship and disorder. It does not. Consistent with Coase (1960), even the most 
efficient institutional structure retains residual levels of both dictatorship and disorder.” (Djankov et al. 
2003a, p. 9)  
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powerful to do this is also strong enough to threaten to expropriate private economic 
actors.10 
However, to its analytic merit, NCE does not assume a priory the superiority of 
private property over any other kind of property and the suboptimality of regulation. 
These become – second best – alternatives to the free market or pure private ordering. 
The idea of comparative institutional efficiency stems from the necessity of an 
economy to navigate safely between the Scylla and Charybdis of the twin goals of 
controlling disorder and dictatorship. The analysis of the tradeoff between the need to 
control disorder that asks for greater state intervention, and the goal of controlling 
dictatorship that requires curbing state power, is applied to the problem of social 
control of business. At the basis of this approach is the idea that, provided that agents 
have freedom of negotiation concerning institutional choices, spontaneous processes 
among the relevant actors will find the proper efficient solution. The only serious 
impediment that could block this virtuous mechanism that is explicitly considered in the 
NCE presentation is institutional transplantation, which obviously contradicts 
contractual freedom. No endogenous reason or mechanism leading to institutional 
inefficiency is considered. 
Although this NCE approach looks at different states of the society in terms of 
disorder and dictatorship and at different institutional solutions (from private litigation 
to regulation and socialism), it really overlooks the qualitative aspects of the issue. These 
concern in particular the consistently different nature, organisation and roles of the state 
and also the judiciary in different contexts. However analytically powerful NCE is and 
however important it may be in explaining particular aspects of the real world, its 
approach is too narrow to serve as the foundation for CES. To do so we must account 
also for consistent (systemic) qualitative differences in the nature of the state and the 
actors operating within it. After all, this is a major difference that distinguishes societies 
and economies and, more importantly, a difference that has important consequences 
not only to economic performance, but also to the nature and behaviour of private 
actors.11 The same holds obviously for qualitative differences of and within the private 
sector. 
Following this unidimensional approach to the economic system, the concept of 
institutional efficiency is one-sided. The only dimension under which different 
economic systems are compared, and consequently the only kind of predicting power of 
the theory, is one in which economies differ as to the degree of protection they provide 
to property rights and how this protection is enforced. It is this simplification that 
prompts the NCE to depict the entire issue in a bidimensional Institutional Possibility 
Frontier (IPF). We will return to this important issue in the next section. 
On this rather narrow analytic approach the NCE takes a general view of 
comparisons: the public and private institutions that characterize every capitalist 
economy "...differ tremendously and systematically among countries, and ... these 
differences have significant consequences for economic and political performance. The 
comparison of these institutions and of their effectiveness, with a focus on 
                                                 
10 “But there are two sides to the security of property rights. On the one hand, investment must be 
secured – typically by the government – from the expropriation by one’s neighbors: thieves, 
competitors, or tort-feasors. …On the other hand, a government capable of protecting property against 
private infringement can itself become the violator and thief.” (Djankov et al. 2003a, p. 2) 
11 For a vivid picture of the crucial importance of the quality of bureaucracy and government in reform 
policies cf. Rodrik (1996).  
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understanding which ones are appropriate in what circumstances, is the subject of the 
New Comparative Economics." (Shleifer 2002, p. 12) 
Along with the relation with CES, the NCE has a rather strict relation with 
institutional economics and with public choice economics. With the former it shares the 
criticism of the neoclassical model of a pure free market economy and obviously the 
view that economic institutions have a fundamental role in determining performance. It 
also shares the concept of comparative institutional efficiency, although it overlooks the 
important transaction cost economics idea of (organisational) governance.12 It is true, 
though, that the NCE is definitely more explicit than the traditional institutional 
economics in recognising and analysing institutional diversity.13 
The NCE has also an important point in common with the field of public choice 
theory (but again also with CES) in emphasising the role of politics. This interest in 
politics derives from the conviction that "[m]ost crucial institutional differences among 
countries –  whether regulating markets or regulating policies –  are governmental." 
(Shleifer 2002, p. 12) Again, this is a simplistic assumption, that overlooks the role of 
crucial differences that exist in other economic institutions in explaining the features of 
economic systems, such as the mobility of resources, the features of capital and financial 
markets, the nature and working of labour markets, and the nature of corporate 
governance systems. Although governmental intervention is often present, in many 
cases it is more the consequence of pre-existing institutional differences than its direct 
cause. CES has a definitely stronger tradition also under this perspective.14 
5.  The representation of comparative institutional efficiency: the IPF 
curve 
The idea of comparative institutional efficiency is quite simple, and therefore 
appealing and potentially powerful in supporting the CES agenda. One earlier, 
important attempt in this direction – although based on transaction cost economics – 
has been due to Dietl (1998). Simple approaches and explanations are always welcome 
in any science, because they can simplify the analysis and allow greater depth into the 
topic. However, simplicity should not come at the expense of explanatory power. This is 
the crucial question that we should address in this section. 
The reductive functional concept of institutions, compared to the richness of 
outcomes of institutional literature, is functional to the NCE analysis. In this 
framework, an institution (e.g. a legal or regulatory system) is a point on the IPF. The 
latter “…reflects the institutional possibilities of the society: how much disorder can be 
reduced with an incremental increase in the power of the state.” (Djankov et al. 2003a, 
p. 7) This definition has a certain strength, since it reflects – albeit only indirectly – a 
greater variety of institutional variables, such as culture, which influence the behaviour 
of society and economic and social actors under the particular angle of disorder and 
dictatorship. 
                                                 
12 See, e.g. Williamson (1991). 
13 "The New Comparative Economics shares with institutional economics the recognition that the pure 
competitive model is not a useful way to think about capitalist economies, and that political and 
economic institutions crucially shape performance. Unlike institutional economics, however, which 
stresses the common achievements of capitalist economies, such as protection of private property, the 
New Comparative Economics focuses on institutional diversity." (Shleifer 2002, p. 12) 
14 For an early truly comparative approach to different economic institutions cf. Wiles (1977). For a recent 
innovative view cf. Aoki (2001).  
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As mentioned above, the NCE explanation is based on the role of law, given 
human nature and, as we will see in the next section, given social features and activities 
in the form of social or “civic” capital. Diagrammatic presentation of the NCE is 
represented in fig. 1, which outlines the issue of institutional possibilities of a given 
country and identifies the efficient institutional solution. 
 
Figure 1: Institutional possibilities fronteer (ipf) 
 
Source: Djankov et al. (2003a), p. 10 
 
The two basic threats to social economic life: disorder and dictatorship, cause 
costs to the society. The costs are represented on the axes of a bi-dimensional diagram. 
Disorder is defined as social losses due to private expropriation and dictatorship is 
defined as social losses due to state expropriation. In both cases, social losses are 
measured relative to a world with perfectly defined and enforced property rights. These 
are not further defined, but we can easily infer from property rights analysis that they 
offer the best possible protection (although not perfect in the NCE view) to private 
rights. Graphically, these should be represented by the IPF which is the closest possible 
to the origin. With this representation the richness of economic life in general and the 
economic system in particular is lost to the advantage of simplification and 
comparability. Basing the analysis on efficiency considerations is certainly an important 
strength of the NCE which allows for predictions on which solutions are better (more 
efficient) in given situations. However, it says nothing on the factors that may enter this 
calculation except property rights protection and even less on how we can get from here 
(a suboptimal institutional situation) to there (optimal institutions). 
As in any standard chart of this type, there is a convex isoquant, which is the 
institutional possibility frontier (IPF) and a constraint, which identifies the total loss 
minimization which is theoretically possible in a given society. In the NCE 
representation the latter has a 45
o slope to represent the symmetric cost deriving to 
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society from social losses due to private expropriation (disorder) and social losses due to 
state expropriation (dictatorship). Although the NCE does not clarify this point, we can 
suppose that societies having different preferences or aversion to disorder and 
dictatorship can be represented by total loss minimisation lines with different slopes. 
This would generate a different mix of disorder and dictatorship in equilibrium. 
Economies can move along the curve and the curve can translate and rotate. The point 
of tangency of the line of total loss minimization with the IPF is the efficient 
institutional choice for a given society or a sector within a society.  
Given the IPF, that is distinct for any society, the society will try to stay on the 
curve, since this is the highest level of institutional efficiency that can be reached. 
Obviously, the society cannot reach a point below the curve, while it would be 
inefficient staying above it. One can suppose that this would create potential rents that 
would give (political) entrepreneurs an incentive to capture, thus moving the society 
back to the curve. 
Politics has an important influence over the choice of institutions. Although 
politics may prevent the choice of efficient institutions, there are at least four significant 
ways in which the political process moves institutions toward efficiency: spontaneous 
evolution, the activity of interest groups favouring efficiency, Coasean bargaining, and 
democratic voting. However, in general the success of politics in choosing efficient 
institutions depends on a society’s ability to cooperate (to negotiate constructively), i.e. 
on its civic capital: “Countries with higher civic capital, and the more attractive IPFs, are 
more likely to have successful political negotiations and to choose an efficient point on 
the IPF. In this very important way, the location of the IPF, and the political choice of a 
point on it, are not independent.” (Djankov et al. 2003a, pp. 37-38) I will return to this 
important issue in the next section. 
The next step is to identify the four strategies to control disorder: private 
orderings, private litigation, regulation, and socialism. While the former three strategies 
are represented in a rather realistic and theoretically sound way, the description of 
socialism is somewhat blurred.  
The NCE's concept of socialism is quite vague and apparently at odds not only 
with the two basic variables of dictatorship and disorder, but also with the other three 
regimes. In the IPF socialism is implicitly defined as the highest level of dictatorship, 
which however belongs to the continuum identified by the IPF curve. Elsewhere, when 
discussing transition countries, socialism is defined as a system alternative to capitalism 
(which as such should not be located on the IPF curve together with the other 
arrangements), more precisely as “the system that concentrates all political power and 
economic decision making in the hands of a small elite” (Djankov et al., 2003a, p. 36). 
Either the concept of socialism is redundant and, as an extreme case of pure regulatory 
regime, meaningless, or it is at odds with the two basic variables defining the IPF. This 
ambiguity of the concept of socialism is apparently the outcome of a deeper lack of 
clarity in defining economic systems and in distinguishing macroeconomic from 
microeconomic levels and processes. 
The contradiction noticed above on the different nature of the term apart, the 
question goes beyond terminology, since the authors use this concept to analyze the 
process of transition. For them there is no distinction, at least theoretically, between full 
state regulation and socialism, let alone among the different types of “socialism” that 
have been described, sketched out and implemented in various countries. This simplistic 
view is obviously a blow to the explanatory power of the theory, in particular when  
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applied to those countries where state regulation or some form of socialism are or were 
an important issue. 
The four strategies are illustrated as points on the institutional possibility 
frontier, ranked in terms of increasing powers of the state. When we move downward 
along the IPF and the role of the state increases, each point representing a distinct 
strategy is associated with progressively diminishing social costs of disorder, and 
progressively rising social costs of dictatorship. The NCE uses this framework to 
analyze efficient institutional choice and to provide empirical predictions and guidance 
for reform. (Djankov et al. 2003a, pp. 5-6) 
In the NCE perspective, then, the IPF is not only a theoretical device: it is also 
an analytical representation of all the (relevant) states of different economies and a one 
which can supply scholars and policy makers with fundamental insights and suggestions 
for reform and policy making. Given this general perspective, such an ambitious goal 
for a simple diagrammatic interpretation requires that a) all the points represented on 
the IPF should be on the same dimension, b) no crucial factor is left out of the diagram, 
and c) qualitative variables – such as the capacity of the state bureaucracy or the social 
control over firms – play no role. 
The NCE proposal is weak under each of these three points. First, and as 
noticed above, the consideration of socialism as a point on the IPF curve is either 
redundant or belongs in a dimension that is different from the rest of the curve. In this 
latter case, convexity would not hold and optimality would not follow. Second, as 
noticed above many crucial variables enter the diagram only indirectly.15 However, the 
authors do not explain why these variables act indirectly or why they are less important 
than those directly considered. Third, we have already seen that quality variables cannot 
be easily discarded, in particular if one wants to explain, interpret and change reality. 
Added to these, any true dynamic perspective is also missing. However, this 
interpretation is interesting and raises several questions when compared to CES. 
Three questions are of particular importance here. First: can the IPF be 
interpreted as the economic system? Apparently, this is the farthest we can go in 
crediting the NCE with some idea of an economic system, beyond the generic 
recognition of “…the amazing consistency with which a given country regulates 
different activities…” (Djankov et al. 2003a, p. 6). These aspects are considered also in 
the important case of the protection of investors, on which there is by now a substantial 
comparative literature, also thanks to the contribution of the same group of scholars 
proposing the NCE.16 According to this literature there are clearly distinct styles of 
social control of business in the areas of entry, courts, and labour in different countries. 
These differences are explained as strictly related to the legal origin of their laws: those 
countries that regulate one (socialist and French legal origin countries) also regulate the 
other two. Similar observations hold, according to the NCE, for state ownership of 
enterprises and banks. The authors find here evidence of the great role of 
transplantation, rather than local conditions, in deeply affecting national modes of social 
control of business. However, the internal logic of each legal model is not examined any 
further. 
                                                 
15 Among the variables that enter the picture in the best case only indirectly are sanctions and incentives, 
without which it is not clear why and how the impersonal “society” could impose its wishes upon 
decision makers. I thank Michael Keren for having drawn my attention to this point. 
16 See, e.g., Djankov et al. (2003b), Djankov et al. (2002), La Porta et al. (1997), La Porta et al. (1999), La 
Porta et al. (2000), La Porta et al. (2002). See also Djankov et al. (2003a), pp. 28-30.  
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Second, is the choice between different institutions continuous along the IPF or 
is it discrete? Looking at the chart and considering various statements in the paper, one 
should think that according to the authors the choice is continuous. This actually blurs 
further the weak systemic concept, since one does not understand where the “amazing 
consistency” can be if the choice is continuous. Possibly even more problematic is the 
fact that the costs of change or other obstacles from one point on the IPF curve to 
another are completely disregarded. How costly can it be to go from one point to the 
other? How does the existence of these transition costs enter the decision making 
calculation of economic agents? And even more so their implementation efforts? How 
can this influence their behaviour?17 Since NCE’s agents are clearly opportunists, free-
riding in institutional change should be at least one of the options considered. NCE 
lacks a theory of collective action to predict success or failure of institutional change. 
Third, are the dimensions generating the IPF sufficient to interpret the 
complexity of an economy (and a society)? Social losses due to disorder or dictatorship 
are determined, in the NCE perspective, by the legal and the political systems. These are 
certainly very important dimensions of social and economic life. However, one is also 
puzzled by the lack of qualification of those systems and the disregard for other 
variables, including economic ones. As to qualifications, do only the formal features of 
the legal and political systems matter?18 What is the role of the quality, e.g. of 
bureaucracy, or social control over politicians, the role of ideology,19 religion or trade 
unions, of education and human capital? 
As to the disregard, do structural and organizational economic variables play no 
role? Let us suppose that two countries at the same level of development share similar 
legal and political systems, but have different types of organization of industry (e.g. in 
terms of the relative weight and role of large and small firms). What kind of 
consequences does this have for the analysis and its predictive power? Or does the 
overwhelming power of the legal system rule out this possibility, because the above 
difference could not exist in countries sharing similar legal systems, but only in countries 
having different legal systems? Could differences in the organisation of industry not 
explain (in part) differences in legal systems? 
Given the tradeoff between disorder and dictatorship, such variables should be 
important for the nature and working of markets and consequently should offer 
different perspectives for private interaction and conflict resolution. They should 
therefore require a different role for the state. The authors may perhaps have this 
problem in mind when they take shelter under the concept of civic capital (see the next 
section). Elsewhere, two of the authors (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003) present an 
interesting analysis applied to the United States, along the same NCE lines. However, 
there the two systems are seen as successive stages of development and no real 
synchronic comparison is made. One should also add that limiting the role of the state 
to regulation of economic activity and disregarding other important functions (e.g. in 
demand management, pursuit of equity, supply of public services, support of 
                                                 
17 On the importance of the costs of transition cf. Dallago (1996). 
18 This problem is simply avoided by stating in a footnote (p. 9) that variables that define the institutional 
quality of a country, such as law and order, risk of government expropriation, rule of law, corruption, 
efficiency of the judiciary, or some combination of these variables “…are highly correlated with each 
other, and have proven to be strong predictors of per capita income, economic growth, and many other 
“good” outcomes, but it is not entirely clear what they measure conceptually.” 
19 On the economic role of ideology cf. Denzau and North (1994).  
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development) leads to the impoverishment and distortion of reality and the weakening 
of theoretical analysis. 
6.  Civic capital and the legal system 
One important statement for comparative analysis and potentially also for 
systemic analysis is that, according to NCE, “[t]he shape and the location of the IPF –
 and hence the efficient choice – varies across activities within a society, as well as across 
societies.” (Djankov et al. 2003a, p. 9). Although this statement is by and large 
acceptable, its explanation reveals some contradiction. In fact, it is stated that activities 
that involve repeated interactions among participants of roughly similar resources and 
that imply little technological change, such as diamond trading, can achieve order with 
little dictatorship. Quite different is the case of activities such as security issuance, that 
involve players with few repeated interactions and massive inequalities of power. These 
activities are vulnerable to much more disorder for a given level of police. This implies 
also (as is stated later in the same paper) that countries having stationary and traditional 
economies should be able to get along with little dictatorship, since they have a low level 
of disorder. The situation of the most economically developed and dynamic countries 
should be the opposite.  
The above reasoning seems to introduce technology as an important force 
shaping institutions, but falls short of deriving important implications. Indeed 
technology, in the examples given, apparently suggests the existence of lock-ins, 
although the authors do not admit this. If we admit that technology limits institutional 
choice and that there is international division of labour, in the sense that different 
countries specialise in different productions that are implemented by means of different 
technologies, then different economies would be consistently constrained to a particular 
area of the IPF. Consequently, not only the shape and the location of the IPF – and 
hence the efficient choice – would vary across societies; also the portion of the IPF that 
is relevant for particular societies would be different. If so, institutional choice would 
not be (completely) free and the movement along the IPF would be neither continuous 
nor smooth. 
Along with this, and perhaps at the basis of all analytical difficulties is the fact 
that the NCE apparently oversimplifies and disregards fundamental explanatory factors, 
as noted above. These include the fact that perhaps institutions do not arise simply to 
control the twin dangers of dictatorship and disorder, however broad is the meaning 
that these two concepts receive. They may also serve to many other aims, such as (to 
remain within the economic domain) to benefit from cooperation, to recover from 
heavy crises (which is not quite the same as controlling disorder as the NCE defines it), 
to impose or defend the power of some (group of) powerful agents, to create or defend 
opportunities for rents, the coordination of common defence against natural or external 
threats, to improve the exploitation of the natural environment, to conquer external 
markets, and many others. Very often the control of dictatorship and disorder is an 
indirect outcome or a step in a longer process of institutional development that pursues 
other goals. More often than not institutional development – as the NCE admits but 
does not develop consistently – is the outcome of spontaneous processes, or of the lack 
of alternative choices. 
But analytic realism comes back soon. Indeed, according to the NCE: “Looking 
across societies, the differences loom even larger. The institutional possibilities of 
modern Sweden, or even China, are far superior to those of Albania or Congo. Sweden  
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can pursue either extreme laissez-faire policies or toy with socialism and still achieve 
decent outcomes, Albania can choose a perfect balance of dictatorship and disorder for 
its IPF, but property rights would remain insecure.” (Djankov et al., 2003a, pp. 9-10) All 
this is rather obvious: how does the NCE explain it? 
To explain this apparent contradiction within the micro-level, the NCE has to 
introduce another concept well-known in sociological and economic analysis, that of 
social capital. The authors term this form of capital as “civic capital”20 and use it to 
explain the location of the IPF.21 Their idea is that societies with more such capital are 
better capable of achieving cooperation among their members. In the NCE parlance, a 
high level of civic capital corresponds to an IPF closer to the origin.  
The use of this concept is apparently at odds with the basic premises of the 
NCE analysis. In fact, it is not clear how much this concept can be based on 
methodological individualism22 that is fundamental to the rest of the explanation. Indeed 
the authors quote various determinants of civic capital, including culture, ethnic 
homogeneity, factor endowments and the physical environment, demographic 
conditions, long run history of cooperation, technology of production and of 
government repression, and the level of human capital. Although all this appears to be 
realistic, many of these determinants have a mostly collective nature and it is not clear 
why and how this explanation should be a logical continuation (or premise?) of the 
explanation of the IPF curve and the rational choice of institutions.  
The need to use such an exogenous device as civic capital theoretically weakens 
the analysis, but makes it more reasonable. Yet we are told that in some countries (e.g. 
Sweden or “even” China) social capital is much higher than in others (e.g. Albania or 
Congo). Does this mean that the determinants of civic capital or, better, investment in 
these determinants are higher (better) in the former group than in the latter? Here again, 
the NCE forgets the crucial quality of variables. After all, criminal organizations and 
                                                 
20 The authors justify – but do not further explain or define – their use of a somewhat different term 
compared to the current literature “because we have something similar but broader in mind. We stick 
with the idea of capital because investments in civic capital pay off in the medium run.” (Djankov et al. 
2003a, p. 9). 
21 Civic capital is given at any point of time and the location of the IPF is fixed in the short run. In the 
short run, then, civic capital is a constraint rather than a choice variable. Under normal conditions it 
evolves over time, as a function of investment in it. However, the authors disregard the important issue 
of the use of civic capital, that can change rapidly during exceptional circumstances, such as political or 
economic crises. In general, similar amounts of civic capital can foster economically productive (e.g. 
diffuse entrepreneurship) or destructive (e.g. Mafia-type) activities depending on the ruling system or 
institutions (Baumol 1993). When the system changes, incentives too change and social actors may put 
the same amount of civic capital to different uses. Thus when transition from a Soviet-type system to a 
market system takes place the same amount of civic capital can support competition and entrepreneurial 
activities instead of bureaucracy (and therefore breed entrepreneurial inclination instead of bureaucratic 
attitudes, corruption, and the like). In the case of collective goods, this is the case, e.g., of civic networks 
fostering ethnic division and conflict or of national pride and cohesion being transformed into 
aggressive nationalism. This transformation may take place in fairly short time, depending on the 
strength of incentives. When transformation is from destructive to productive activities, and since the 
IPF position measures the potential of a country in terms of the production or destruction of social 
losses, transition should correspond to a fairly rapid inward translation of the IPF, perhaps similarly to 
the case of transplantation that the authors consider. In fact, the same amount of civic capital used in a 
different  and more productive manner should correspond to a lower mix of disorder and dictatorship. 
This was after all what motivated transition. 
22 The basic reference for the explanation of social capital based on methodological individualism is 
Coleman (1990). Cf. also Lin (2001). I thank Antonio Chiesi (University of Trento) for this information.  
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Mafias also require a great deal of social or civic capital. What determines the allocation 
of those variables to constructive uses? (Baumol 1993). This is a task ahead for the 
NCE. 
Obviously, it is the conception of economic actors as selfish and opportunistic 
and only ready to subvert the workings of the law to benefit themselves that is at odds 
with the concept of civic capital. It is difficult to accept that such actors go well beyond 
the standard solution of cooperation in repeated interaction (Axelrod, 1984) and invest 
in social capital in order to overcome the well known suboptimal outcome that would 
derive from the lack of cooperation. In any case, since civic capital is clearly a public 
good, selfish and opportunistic actors should free ride. To avoid this danger, we need a 
Deus ex machina: institutions, that constrain such actors to cooperate in the protection of 
property rights. In reality it may work, but why is this process successful only in a 
minority of societies, while in the rest the process has been a failure? And why should 
opportunistic actors invest in institutions? Or is some third party imposing these 
institutions?  
The explanation that NCE offers for the existence of institutions, let alone of 
different economic systems, is hardly convincing. In fact, in this way institutions 
become in a sense alien to the intimate nature of individual actors, a product of pure 
rationalisation. One can certainly suppose that this is so in theory. However, when 
pretending to use a model to interpret reality – and even more so when pretending to 
use it to change the reality – one should be careful in confronting the analytic premises 
with what the observation of reality shows. 
The reasoning is subtle: since economic actors have property rights, it is in their 
interest to invest in civic capital and hence determine the choice of efficient institutions, 
i.e. those institutions that protect those rights in the best way and give the strongest 
incentives to the economic utilization of those rights. Supposedly each individual gains 
more from those rights than he has to pay in the form of investment in civic capital and 
has no other way to give up the payment while keeping the advantages. Since 
institutions are a public good, why doesn’t a selfish rational actor abstain from investing, 
while still enjoying the return from the investment that others would do? Looking at the 
NCE I can see only two answers. One is that there is an external enforcer (the state). 
But then why did the actors set up a state? Even the state is, after all, a costly institution. 
So even this first answer boils down to the second one: selfish actors do not free ride 
because institutions constrain them. We have returned in our explanation to the starting 
point, and we are left in the NCE without a theory of institutions.  
The NCE offers a more convincing but partial explanation of institutions in the 
case of countries other than the most developed ones. Transplantation of institutions is 
the cause of their lower development: “One dramatic deviation from the assumption of 
indigenous formation of institutions is transplantation.” (Djankov et al., 2003a, p. 27) 
Transplantation can take place through conquest and colonization, but it may also go 
through voluntary channels. One prominent example of the latter is the voluntary 
adoption of the German legal system in Switzerland, Austria-Hungary, and later Japan. 
One can think also of much of the transition in Central-Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union.23 
This is a reasonable answer, again, which misses a crucial factor. If 
transplantation is the cause, one must admit that there are asymmetries among countries 
                                                 
23 The NCE considers transplantation, and particularly the understanding of its diverse consequences, “a 
crucial challenge for the new comparative economics” (Djankov et al. 2003a, p. 33).  
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at least as far as power and freedom of choice is concerned. More than true. If this is so 
for countries, why shouldn’t it also be true within individual economies and societies, 
among individuals and possibly complex agents, such as firms? Why is this problem 
solved in developed countries by institutions and in the socially best possible way 
supposing that actors are perfectly equal? Having expelled from – or not even 
considered in – the analysis social relations, giving an answer to this question becomes 
impossible. Indeed, the NCE ignores it by means of what looks like a tautology. 
7.  Institutional efficiency and reform 
The NCE sees its effort as an important device for implementing better reform 
policies. This operational aim requires that the NCE analysis and policy recipes are 
soundly based on a correct interpretation of real economies. Reforms are needed 
because the existing institutional setting is suboptimal. Inefficient institutions burden 
economic actors with too many and high costs due to excessive disorder or excessive 
dictatorship. The hypothesis of rationality is sufficient to understand the motivation for 
reform in the NCE context. 
But reforms are complex and costly social and political undertakings and require 
the cooperation of many individuals. Who, then, should take the decision of 
implementing a reform when interpersonal and intertemporal variables matter? The 
answer is generic: “the society” (Djankov et al., 2003a, p. 11) “…through its 
institutions” (ibid, p. 12). But what is a “society”? How can a social and economic entity 
made of selfish individuals create and nurture a society? The best part of the issue, the 
one that can highlight the distinction among different systems, is missing. And how can 
institutions – that are after all interpersonal and interorganisational relations – act? Only 
individuals (and organizations) can act. Why and in which way? 
The NCE supplies no answer to these crucial questions. This silence actually 
means that the NCE concept of institutions and the institutional analysis is at least 
incomplete, possibly wrong. It leaves unexplained what should most be explained – 
being this the essence of the comparative approach, let alone the comparative analysis 
of economic systems. 
The authors discuss the important example of the social control of securities 
issues, which concerns the particular features of the four possible choices along the IPF, 
and their relative merits and disadvantages (inefficiencies). Even here it is unclear who 
should start reforms or decide which choice should be made. Stating that the society is 
the decision maker is clearly unsatisfactory, since it avoids solving any of the obscure 
aspects stressed above. 
Even if we suppose that “the society” acts, two crucial aspects remain 
unanswered. First, do the four possible choices the society confronts afford the same 
(absolute level and structure of) costs of choice and implementation? Are these costs the 
same (in both level and structure) in any society? Clearly this has much to do with the 
probability that one particular option is chosen. Choice does not only depend on the 
preference for (or aversion to) a particular degree of public control. In their choices 
rational actors should pay particular attention to costs. Apparently not in the NCE, 
though, in spite of the recognition of “…Coase’s (1960) realization that the costs of 
enforcement shape the optimal institutional choice.” (Djankov et al., 2003a, p. 15) And 
also in spite of the fact that different societies are distinguished on the basis of the mix 
of social losses due to disorder and dictatorship in the IPF analysis.  
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Second, how is demand for institutional reform organized? Although it is clear 
that the demand for reforms arises from the unsatisfactory performance of old 
institutions, a reform requires that social actors express their demand, perhaps by 
delegating some individual or organ (the government?) to do so by means of some kind 
of voting mechanism. However, the NCE does not explain why this individual or 
organisation should implement what is delegated to him. Control, incentives or 
sanctions are not considered. It is not clear either which type of reform is delegated. It is 
true that the efficient solution is unique, if there is perfect symmetry of resource 
endowment, knowledge, information and bargaining power among individual agents and 
if these share the same ideological (dis)preferences. However, the simplicity and 
elegance of this solution does not explain why in reality consistently and permanently 
different economic systems exist even in competitive contexts. 
To clarify the true novelty and importance of the NCE for CES, let us consider 
in some detail one of the three cases that the authors consider. I choose the one that is 
the closest to our times: post-communist transition. This is indeed the most difficult test 
for the NCE approach, inter alia because the institutional and systemic dispersion 
(variety) of the countries involved is the greatest. The two other cases are the divergence 
between France and England in the 12th and 13th centuries in their choices of legal 
systems and the rise of the regulatory state in the progressive era in the United States. In 
all three instances, the authors focus on efficient institutional choice, given each 
country’s IPF. 
Although the authors caution that they do not pretend to explain all the aspects 
of transition, nevertheless they offer a wide-ranging explanation based on the NCE 
framework. The complexity of transition is reduced to a tradeoff between dictatorship 
and disorder. The collapse of communism, i.e. the old system, and the following 
dramatic decline in dictatorship led to a rise of disorder. Although the latter has had 
some obvious benefits in terms of freedom, the growth of entrepreneurship, and 
openness to the rest of the world, it has also had great costs, particularly in the form of 
extreme economic disorganization. The latter includes booming unofficial economy, 
subversion of institutions by the powerful through crime, corruption and political 
influence and obviously the disintegration of the USSR and various severe problems of 
localism within Russia iyself. 
Since the grip of dictatorship was the strongest in the Soviet Union, Russia has 
experienced a much more dramatic decline in dictatorship and rise in disorder than 
other countries. These processes have also been much stronger than in the non-
reforming post-Soviet states, such as Belarus and Uzbekistan. So Russia moved swiftly 
along her IPF curve from dictatorship in the direction of disorder. Russia in 1990 and 
the non-reforming post-Soviet states throughout the decade remained in the low part of 
the curve, with much dictatorship and little disorder. Apparently no movement of the 
IPF curve took place in this case, although the authors consider that such shifts took 
place in the other two cases they examine. 
However, the transition processes in Russia and in (Central-)Eastern Europe 
were not identical. The authors explain this fact by supposing that “…Russia’s IPF is 
probably less attractive than that of the East European countries and, at the same time, 
its shift along the IPF was probably greater.” (Djankov et al., 2003a, p. 24) The reasons 
for this relative advantage of Central-Eastern Europe compared to Russia are shorter 
time spent in the communist system, the rebellions in some countries against the Soviet 
occupiers and local dictators, the existence of many more independent organizations  
EJCE, vol. 1, n. 1 (2004) 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
76 
and, in the case of Poland, an independent Church, greater integration into Western 
Europe, and the perspective of joining the European community, which impose rules of 
cooperation that restrict dictatorship and disorder. Most of the quoted facts suggest that 
the authors suppose that no investment in civic capital took place during Soviet times, 
and that pre-existing civic capital was depleted. Central and Eastern European countries 
also face less severe problems of decentralization and localism compared to Russia, 
which may explain why they did not move as far up along their IPFs. 
All this is apparently correct if we accept the IPF approach. But then we do not 
explain much. Why did Russia move so fast upward its IPF? Why did this not happen – 
at least not in such a sweeping manner – in Central-Eastern Europe? Why did the IPF 
curves remain in their previous location (see footnote 21)? Shouldn’t transition have 
moved them towards the origin, if the market economy – the new freely chosen set of 
institutions – is more efficient than the Soviet-type one? Didn’t the efficiency approach 
work out in Eastern Europe and if so, why?  
A tentative and partial answer to some of these questions is given as follows: 
“A plausible case can be made that Russia in the 1990s stayed on its institutional possibility 
frontier. It has moved away from the communist dictatorship, but arguably overshot initially in 
its institutional change toward too much disorder. Under the Putin presidency, Russia has 
moved down along its IPF toward reducing disorder, even at the cost of some growth in 
dictatorship.” (Djankov et al., 2003a, p. 26) 
This explanation is week indeed. Although it describes correctly what actually 
happened, it gives no explanation of why things occurred in that way and in particular 
why Russia failed to choose more efficient institutions.24 What apparently comes out 
from this description is that transition did not change the economic system – at least if 
one thinks that systemic change means shifting the IPF as explained above. One point is 
important in this description, though: the recognition that there is no absolute, but only 
relative efficiency criterion: 
“The more general point suggested by this reasoning is that economic and social change in 
each country should be considered in light of its own institutional possibilities, rather than 
some idealized view of perfect law and order.” (Djankov et al 2003a, p. 26) 
And again: 
“The fact that colonial transplantation is such a significant determinant of institutional 
design suggests that the observed institutional choices may well be inefficient. A legal and 
regulatory system perfectly suitable for France might yield inefficiently high levels of regulation 
and state ownership when transplanted to countries with lower civic capital.” (Djankov et al. 
2003a, p. 30) 
This quotation is important because it makes clear that only spontaneous 
institutional developments, based on domestic endowments, are efficient and 
consequently stable. This is standard mainstream economics, still it has important 
practical relevance. However, the NCE falls short of extending this approach further. 
Why should inter-country transplantation be (often) inefficient and domestic 
institutional choice always efficient? Put in another way: why are domestic actors in 
                                                 
24 In a more recent paper (Shleifer and Treisman, 2003) the authors state that, after a decade of 
extraordinary transformation, by the late 1990s Russia had become a typical middle-income capitalist 
democracy. This statement is apparently in contrast with the other statements quoted above. We can 
interpret jointly this apparent contradiction by supposing that, in the NCE view, correct policies are 
finally chosen and are effective, but their costs are the higher, the farther away the IPF is from the 
origin. This is somehow fatalist, since even systemic change is unable to move the IPF inward. Again, 
the meaning of systemic change remains blurred.  
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developed economies capable of negotiating freely the establishment of more efficient 
institutions, while actors in other countries are prevented from doing so? Why do 
asymmetries exist among countries and not within countries?  
Let us suppose that a powerful social group (a social class, an interest group, a 
political party, a group of army officers or a criminal organisation) gains overwhelming 
power in institution making. Is this a guarantee of efficient institutional choice? If 
imposition is exerted upon other social groups, is this not comparable to the case of 
transplantation? A quotation reported above makes clear that efficient institutions could 
evolve also from the not-so-democratic influence of growth-seeking interest groups and 
from a Coasean negotiation among the members of the elite. These are examples of 
growth promoting devices (however socially costly they may be), but growth promotion 
is not the only possible motivation of social activity. 
If the society moved outward the IPF because of rising disorder (a clear sign of 
institutional dissatisfaction), trading off less disorder for more dictatorship does not 
move further the society outward and can even move it inward back to the curve. Or so 
is the justification of the promoters of the “extraordinary” means of institutional choice. 
However, it is not clear why those who are disadvantaged or even suffer for such 
institutional choice should be willing to accept the outcome, threat and repression in the 
real world apart (which, by the way, are economic costs). They will certainly try to 
subvert the outcome as soon as possible, thus raising further the costs of change. It is 
therefore not clear why we should not consider the possibility of domestic institutional 
“transplantation” (or, better, imposition) as a source of institutional inefficiency. The 
only such case the authors envisage, albeit only implicitly, is the Soviet system. After all, 
interest groups and negotiations among the members of the elite are not cases of pure 
competitive market mechanism working. Evolutionary economics has a clear advantage 
here, when it shows that evolutionary change may be inefficient. 
But again the explanation of institutional possibilities – and the position of the 
society on the IPF chart – remains rather vague and excessively general (see above). For 
instance, the fact that change in each country should be considered in light of its own 
institutional possibilities seems to suggest the existence of a path-dependent process of 
change. However, it is not explicitly stated whether it is so and even less is it explained 
why and through which processes this takes place and what are the consequences for 
change itself. Is Russia a case of perverse path dependence and Central-Eastern Europe 
one of positive path dependence? It is apparently so, but again no explanation. Nor is it 
clear how this perspective can be included into the main body of analysis. 
In this way, the NCE promises much but implements rather little as a general 
theory for comparative economics. It seems more interested in rationalizing what has 
been happening (and that we already know) than in explaining why it was so and 
through which processes this took place. Clearly its predictive power is thereby limited. 
The NCE may use the wrong analytical instruments or it is unable to give the proper 
theoretical framework to those instruments. Apparently both problems are relevant. Or 
perhaps the main mistake is to claim to reestablish an entire discipline on a consistent, 
but rather one-sided approach. 
8.  The tricky role of legal origin 
Legal origin is, in the analytic approach of the law and finance economics and 
hence also the NCE, the most important exogenous device that explains inter-country 
differences in the social control of business and consequently also in the economic  
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system. Since legal origin is a type of market imperfection and is consequently the 
source of comparative inefficiency, it determines the actual location of a particular 
country on its IPF, which does not coincide with the optimal position.25 This is true 
both in the case of developed economies and in that of developing economies, the 
difference being that the latter’s IPF is external to the former’s due to transplantation of 
institutions. 
Legal origin also explains why the existing institutions fall short of their potential 
and suggest some possible directions for reform. In the NCE approach, the legal system 
limits dictatorship and disorder in fixed proportions. Any legal system can be 
represented as a ray emanating from the origin and defining the proportions of disorder 
and dictatorship. The equilibrium position of any particular country is identified by the 
intersect of this ray with the country’s own IPF. Based on the findings of a substantial 
research program in which this group of authors has been involved over the years, they 
maintain that the common law ray has a higher ratio of disorder to dictatorship than the 
civil law ray. 
This representation has important policy implications. Since in their view 
transplantation makes the IPF shift outwards, the authors conclude that the marginal 
amount of dictatorship required to reduce disorder rises. This amounts to saying that 
the marginal productivity of dictatorship decreases, because in developing countries the 
judiciary is particularly inefficient and corrupt. It is for this reason that, in their view and 
contrary to the findings of other authors (cf. Stiglitz 1994), less developed countries 
need relatively  less dictatorship in equilibrium, i.e., less regulation, than developed 
countries. Under these circumstances, “[d]eregulation is likely to diminish the problems 
of dictatorship without a significant increase in disorder.” (Djankov et al. 2003a, p. 32) 
This is so particularly in those areas where market competition and discipline are most 
effective in controlling disorder. 
In my view, the issue of legal origin may be at odds with civic capital. The idea 
of institutional transplantation suggests that transplanting institutions is like forcing an 
extraneous organism (the transplanted institutions) upon a body used to function 
according to different institutions. If an institutional organism (the receiver) is diverse 
compared to another organism (the transplanter), individual features too in the former 
(including capabilities, cognitive processes and organizational competences) are different 
from those that the transplanted institutions require. Therefore, even if the judiciary 
would be perfectly incorrupt and hard working in the former country, the transplanted 
institutions would impose upon that organism exceptional adaptation and learning and 
resistance costs (resistance to and rejection of the transplanted institutions). Inefficiency 
is the most obvious consequence. The IPF would shift outwards even without 
considering “less attractive” civic capital. It is the working of transplanted institutions 
that is costlier (perhaps this can be identified with higher transaction costs) or, 
alternatively, investment in the transplanted institutions generates lower returns than 
comparable investment in indigenous institutions. 
                                                 
25 Legal origin affects growth only indirectly through the specific mechanisms of social control. These 
affect markets for capital, labour, and entrepreneurs, thereby influencing factor accumulation and 
productivity growth. Any direct influence on growth (e.g. by human capital of the people operating the 
institutions) must work, in the NCE view, through its influence on civic capital, which is represented as 
the location of the IPF. In principle and as M. Keren notes, it should also determine the IPF slope. 
However, the Authors disregard this aspect in discussing the IPF.  
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All this, however, the NCE disregards, to concentrate simply on regulation and 
deregulation as policy alternatives. The only mention of this kind of problems is when it 
is said that how institutions are transplanted may also matter. The NCE authors also 
recall authors who stress the importance of “receptivity” for the success of 
transplantation of legal systems, perhaps forgetting other authors who, in a more 
convincing way, have reached similar conclusions two decades earlier (e.g. Sylos-Labini 
1983) 
9.  The “Old” New Comparative Economics and Comparative Economic 
Systems 
The NCE also meets a terminology problem. The term New Comparative 
Economics is not new. It was first used in a 1989 article by Irwin L. Collier, Jr. that was 
published in one of the journals of the American Association for Comparative 
Economic Studies.26 Collier supports an interesting point of view, which is of relevance 
for the topic discussed here. After maintaining that a myriad of programs of economic 
research belonged to CES, he groups these programs into two broad, yet distinct areas: 
analysis of economic systems and the methodology of comparative economic analysis. 
He uses the definition of “new comparative economics” to indicate “…the current 
duplex of the analysis of economic systems and comparative economic analysis.” (emphasis in the 
original, p. 24) This is meant as “…a branch from the mainstream of analytical 
economics.” (Ibid., p. 27) This latter, strong statement leads Collier not to include an 
author like János Kornai in the field, a conclusion that few, at least in Europe, would 
accept. 
According to Collier this change in the discipline took place starting in the early 
1970s, when the old NCE became increasingly analytic and as such a part of modern 
economics, and accelerated with the founding of the Journal of Comparative Economics. The 
NCE replaced progressively the previous primary task of correct labelling and 
classification of economic systems and the documentation of the great variety of 
existing systems. However, the discipline kept its distinctiveness, thanks to its 
“…overriding concern for the effect on economic behaviour and performance of 
‘unconventional’ institutional constraints, 'unconventional' objective functions and 
'unconventional' mechanisms for the coordination of economic activity.” (p. 25) 
It is this latter statement that makes the “old” NCE distinct from the “new” 
NCE. What distinguishes them is not so much the broad theoretical reference, namely 
mainstream economics, but the object of study: “unconventional” economies in the 
former, “conventional” capitalist economies in the latter. As to the broad method, there 
are no radical differences in view, since the “old” NCE – similarly to the “new” one –
  stressed that that method must comprise both “careful institutional and historical 
description and the patient sifting and collating of statistical data” together with the 
application of quantitative methods, and the use of mathematics and modelling. 
I share Collier’s view that a major shift in the discipline took place more than 
three decades ago. The most important evidence for this change was possibly the 
publication in 1971 of a proceeding volume that included some landmark papers.27 This 
was a shift primarily in the approach, that became more analytical, and in the method, 
                                                 
26 Cf. Collier (1989). 
27 Cf. Eckstein (1971).  
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that shifted towards quantitative research and mathematical modelling without deserting 
descriptive and interdisciplinary approaches. 
However, between that shift and the supposed new one there was a watershed: 
transition in Central and Eastern Europe and globalisation. There also was a remarkable 
evolution and change in economic thought, with revival and rapid development, among 
others, of institutional and evolutionary economics. These are certainly sufficient 
reasons to justify a new shift in the object of study. Since a change in the object may 
require the use of novel methods and also enquiry into new problems, these could also 
be sufficient reasons for a major shift in analytical methods. Is the “new” NCE 
representing this second major shift? And if so, in which sense? 
In order to answer this latter question in a very rough way, a short examination 
of the EconLit database may be useful. EconLit includes coverage of over 400 major 
journals as well as articles in collective volumes, books, book reviews, dissertations, and 
working papers licensed from the Cambridge University Press Abstracts of Working 
Papers in Economics. Over 99% of the articles are in English or include English 
summaries. This database is somehow biased, since it excludes the largest part of 
publications in languages other than English and in journals of smaller countries. 
Econlit classification is also somewhat inconsistent from our point of view, since many 
publications that belong in CES are not classified in group P (Economic systems), but in 
group O (Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth), which has a 
subgroup O5 (Economywide Country Studies) that includes studies of the economic 
system of various countries and also the subgroup O57 (Comparative Studies of 
Countries). However, there are sufficient reasons to rely on this database as a broad 
approximation, since it is a standard in the profession, and in any case it is the most 
easily accessible. 
At the time of writing, the electronic database is defined as including 
publications since 1991 and up to September 2003. It actually includes publications 
since 1969, although prior to 1991 the classification was different and not easily 
comparable. For this reason I limit my brief examination to 1991 and the following 
years up to 2002, because 2003 is clearly incomplete (2002 too seems to be in process of 
being completed). Keeping these limitations in mind, the twelve years considered, that 
coincide with the period of transition in Central and Eastern Europe, witnessed the 
publication of more than 1000 works that the authors themselves or Econlit consider to 
belong to the CES field (group P). 
According to Econlit classification, most publications (54%) are on comparative 
economic systems and more than 9% are not classified in any subgroup, but are 
attributed to CES in general. This makes the remarkable share of close to 64% 
(including the few publications on economic systems in general). Out of the remaining 
nearly 37%, the majority is in the field of socialist systems and transition economies 
(more than 20%) and socialist institutions and transition (5.3%). Only 7.2% of the 
considered publications deal with capitalist systems and publications on “Other 
Economic Systems” (basically developing economies) are barely present. The tentative 
conclusion, then, would be that if there is dominance in the field, it is of studies on the 
economic system and comparisons, while the supposed dominance of studies on 
“unconventional” economic systems is a secondary feature (see table 1). 
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Table 1. Classification of publications in the field of comparative economic systems in Econlit (1991-2002) 
 
 No.  % 
P00 General  8  0.8% 
P1 Capitalist Systems  73  7.2% 
P2 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies  203  20.1% 
P3 Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions  53  5.3% 
P4 Other Economic Systems  18  1.8% 
P5 Comparative Economic Systems  654  64.8% 
P6 Total  1009  100.0% 
 
 
It is true, however, that the dominant part of studies on comparative economic 
systems (more than 26% of the total of the studies classified by Econlit), consist of 
comparative studies of particular economies. The majority of these, nearly 45%, are 
indeed on economies in transition (including China). However, their concentration is 
particularly high in the first half of the Nineties and their share has been progressively 
decreasing in later years. At the same time, inter-systemic comparisons, including 
comparisons among capitalist, socialist or transition, and developing economies, make 
up nearly one quarter of the group. Studies on capitalist economies represent more than 
22% and became relatively more frequent in later years. A minor part of studies is 
devoted to developing countries. However, these trends take place along with a marked 
decline in the number of publications belonging in CES (see chart 2). 
Now we have sufficient, although tentative elements to answer the accusation 
that the “New” NCE raises against CES. First, it is not true that CES dealt primarily 
with socialist and transition economies, even less so that it did practically nothing else, at 
least since the Nineties. There is a clear dominance of truly comparative studies, often 
involving inter-systemic comparisons. Second, there is a true problem with CES that the 
NCE overlooks, namely the rapid decrease since 1997 in the number of publications 
that authors or Econlit recognise as belonging to CES. This may be due to rapid 
decrease in the number of publications by scholars in the field, to their publishing in 
different fields, to the placement of articles in different groups, or to a combination of 
these factors.28 In any case the problem is clear and serious. In this perspective, a 
contribution to the field by an important group of scholars can only be welcome. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 During the Nineties most journals started to ask authors to personally attribute Econlit codes to their 
articles, but not their books. The decline of CES publications may reflect therefore the desire of 
Authors to place their articles into more “prestigious” groups.  
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Chart 2. Yearly number of publications in the field of comparative economic systems according 
to Econlit (1991-2002) 
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10. Conclusions: The “new” comparative economics and comparative 
economic systems 
I have considered here the new comparative economics, comparing its approach 
and findings with those of the more traditional field of comparative economic studies 
and contrasting its appearance with the situation of CES. It appears that the arrival of 
NCE is a welcome event that enriches the discipline. However, due to its intrinsic 
features and limitations, its pretension to replace CES is misplaced. 
The “new” New Comparative Economics (NCE), taken in its entirety is an 
important project having both strengths and weaknesses. I consider first its general 
aspects. Among the strengths I put the idea of innovating the discipline while keeping 
the powerful comparative approach. This may foster further the innovation of CES by 
embedding in it a set of instruments and approaches that are the results of an important 
line of comparative research. I also put here the NCE stress on the need for a 
microeconomic approach, whereby the centre of analysis becomes the institutions that 
form the economic system, and the stress over the need to analyse the consequences 
deriving from the inter-country differences among particular institutions. 
However, these same strengths hide methodological and analytical weaknesses 
and dangers. The stress that this approach puts upon individual, albeit complex 
institutions – legal systems – is one of the basic reasons why NCE loses the complexity 
of the whole economic system and of the basic network of mutual interaction that links 
all the constituent institutions. This may have important consequences not only for 
analytical soundness, but particularly for policy implications. The strength of the  
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“traditional” CES approach to comparing different economic systems is the awareness 
that individual institutions are embedded in the broader network of links that connects 
all these institutions and that may generate complementarity among different 
institutions, externalities and path dependence. Since these features create multiple 
equilibria, the important issue of institutional efficiency becomes much more complex 
and possibly less straightforward than the NCE depicts. 
There also are, as often happens, aspects that cannot be precisely defined a 
priori. The NCE actually restricts its method to what the law and finance perspective 
offers, namely the economic consequences of legal systems, enriched with the economic 
role of civic capital which jointly determine the form and position of the IPF. By 
restricting the method, greater consistency may be reached, at the price of some 
methodological unilateralism. Which one prevails, analytical strength and depth or 
disregard for complexity and the interactions among the variables, depends to a large 
extent on the particular topic that is analysed. Certainly this approach restricts 
methodological variety, thereby narrowing the spectrum of problems that can be 
fruitfully analysed and the possibility of offering competing confutable interpretations 
and explanations. 
Finally, there are mistaken statements, as often is the case with “new” 
approaches that aim at finding their place in, and possibly dominating, an established 
field. Major among these is the actual identification of “the traditional field of 
comparative economics” with the study of socialism and the comparison of socialism 
and capitalism. However, this statement is actually contradicted in a footnote that states 
that “[t]his field has its own category in the Journal of Economic Literature, called Economic 
Systems.” (Djankov et al. 2003a, p. 1) The traditional discipline, then, is much wider and 
varied than the proponents of NCE are ready to admit and their statement is not 
supported even by a superficial look at EconLit classification, as we saw above (section 
9). In supposed contrast with the presumed unilateralism of CES, the NCE privileges 
comparisons of alternative capitalist models. 
It is now time to summarise the main points of our examination and try to 
answer the questions advanced in the introduction. 
First, the NCE is clearly comparative. Less clear is its standing on the economic 
system. The idea and the evidence that there is something that strongly keeps together 
and coordinates institutions of the same kind is embedded in the NCE. Unfortunately, 
the NCE goes no further and barely recognises this fact. We are left without an 
explanation why this is so and, perhaps more important, what are the analytic 
consequences of this fact. Although according to the NCE it is not apparently possible 
– or is inefficient – to go from one “style” or system to the other, we have no 
explanation why this would be so. The same ignorance remains in the case of transition: 
is it only the transition between different legal systems that is inefficient, or is any kind 
of transition inefficient? We are told that such attempts at change take place, but we are 
not provided with an explanation regarding the conditions that govern the change and 
its outcomes. As a consequence, the NCE really lacks any serious role for the economic 
system. In this perspective, the NCE restricts itself to a thin context (law and order) and 
an even thinner economic system (legal regimes). 
Second, the NCE is innovative only in part, at least in the sense that it does not 
innovate the subject. The subject to which it proposes to restrict its analytical effort was 
always there, although perhaps not in a dominant position. It is more innovative in the 
method, because it introduces to the discipline a method – particularly in the law and  
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finance perspective –  that has not often been used in CES and that has shown its 
strength elsewhere. Although it has been shown to be important,  this approach does 
not appear sufficient to provide satisfactory answers to the many varied problems that 
CES deal with. However, it can certainly contribute – and has already contributed – to 
the discovery of new problems and to the provision of new explanations. It is only to be 
hoped that CES will also take advantage of other disciplines by applying their methods 
to typical CES problems.29 
Third, and most importantly, I see many problems in the NCE pretension of 
replacing CES. They share the comparative approach, but from the perspective of 
methodology integration is not easy. The NCE has a very well defined and distinct 
method that allows it to reach important results in well defined and limited cases. On 
the other side, CES does not have a distinct method, but is more an eclectic field of 
research in which researchers belonging to different schools of economic thought and 
following different theories work on problems of more or less common interest. In a 
sense, CES is a competitive arena, while the NCE aspires to be a monopoly. Due to this 
rather loose methodological nature of CES, the NCE can easily integrate in the field and 
enrich it. It is hard to imagine that it will replace all the extremely rich spectrum of 
methods that are present in CES. It can offer additional opportunities and challenge the 
results reached by means of different methods. In this sense it can play a fundamental 
role in enriching CES and stimulating its evolution. 
In short, chances are that the NCE will complement CES by offering new 
methods and studying new problems or presenting new solutions to known problems, 
thus challenging other approaches and competing with them. This can add to the health 
of the discipline. I think that the most important NCE statement in this sense is the 
following: 
“… now economics can move further, and recognize that different institutions are 
appropriate in different circumstances. This, we believe, is the goal of the new comparative 
economics. …reforms in any country should be evaluated relative to its own institutional 
opportunities, rather than some idealized benchmark free of dictatorship and disorder.” 
(Djankov et al. 2003a p. 38) 
This statement is important because it stresses a vital component of the NCE 
program: look for the country and system specific conditions that constrain the pursuit 
of efficiency and devise reforms that are compatible with the existing structural features 
of each system. This is an important program for the evolution of economic systems, as 
against their convergence. 
To do this, CES does not have to share the NCE belief that “…institutional 
diversity can in part be understood in terms of the fundamental tradeoff between 
controlling dictatorship and disorder.” (Djankov et al. 2003a p. 38) Although the use of 
the tradeoff is problematic, as I tried to show above, I think we can agree with this last 
conclusion: “…the comparative perspective, which identifies both the possibilities and 
the limitations of individual societies, can serve as a useful framework for future 
progress.” (Djankov et al. 2003a p. 38) Putting the CES agenda in this perspective 
would mean simply to accelerate the implementation of the “old” NCE. Also in this 
sense, the “new” NCE is a component of this process, not its whole. 
 
 
                                                 
29 I have particularly in mind transaction cost economics and evolutionary economics.  
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